Abstract: This paper examines factors that shape people's perceptions of government corruption in mainland China. We are particularly interested in how people acquire information on local corruption, given the general lack of pertinent first-hand experience. We combine the data from a national survey in mainland China with a compiled dataset on the number of local corruption cases reported in Chinese local newspapers. The results of Probit and Heckman Selection models both show that indirect formal and indirect informal information sources have diverging effects. While coverage of corruption by newspapers controlled by the authoritarian regime reduces people's perceptions of corruption, exposure to grapevine news significantly increases perceived corruption. Moreover, access to government-controlled media can significantly dilute the negative impact of grapevine news on popular perceptions of corruption.
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We argue that in many cases, people's perceptions of government corruption are based on indirect information from various sources, including formal channels like mass media and informal ones such as rumors. And informal information sources are of particular salience in shaping such perceptions in societies like Russia and mainland China, where the mass media have been controlled to various extents by their respective governments. Living in societies without a guaranteed free flow of information, people tend to seek information from unofficial sources like grapevine rumors and gossip. Moreover, such unofficial sources often provide people with information that their regime does not want to be circulated. Thus, in such societies, the coexistence of controlled mass media, which provide people with information that the government has tailored and intended for political propaganda and/or mobilization, and grapevine news, which provides people with rich but mostly negative information about the government, generates some complex but fascinating dynamics in shaping people's perceptions of government corruption.
In this paper, we use a unique combined data set to test the impacts of a variety of information on Chinese citizens' perceptions of corruption in their local governments. We find that grapevine news, which is often full of speculations and deliberate distortions, can exert a strongly negative influence on people's perceptions of government corruption. But more importantly, information from different sources also interacts with each other: formal coverage of corruption cases in controlled mass media can significantly dilute the negative impact of grapevine news on public perceptions of corruption, presumably by filling in informational gaps and clarifying unfounded speculations. Our findings suggest that authoritarian regimes may still benefit from "propaganda," even in the era of information explosion, through cunning media control and manipulation. In comparison with the situation of fully blocking access to unwanted 4 information in the mass media, controlled-liberalization of mass media with strategic agendasetting and issue framing may help authoritarian regimes significantly improve their public image and even contribute to their longevity to some extent. We start our analyses by presenting the results of questions on perceived corruption in a 2002 mainland China national survey as part of the Asian Barometer Survey I (hereafter ABS I).
The results show that in addition to the media controlled by the government, Chinese citizens also rely heavily on grapevine rumors for pertinent information on government corruption. We then review existing literature on the effects of distinct information sources and develop competing hypotheses to explain the impacts of information from different sources on people's perceptions of corruption. Then, using the ABS I data and a data set compiled on the number of corruption cases reported in Chinese local newspapers in 2002, we test those hypotheses. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of the findings in this paper.
Popular Perceptions of Corruption in China
Ordinary Chinese people may use the word corruption, or fubai, referring to any form of improper behavior by government officials that they are dissatisfied. It can range from economic crimes such as graft, bribery, and embezzlement, to official malfeasance less relevant to monetary gains, such as shirking and torture, as well as to individual misbehavior indicating moral decay, such as having mistresses (e.g., Guo, 2008; Wedeman, 2005) . In ABS I, several questions were used to tap people's perceptions of corruption, as well as their possible information sources.
1 Two of them: "how widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local government?" and "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the central government?" were designed to measure people's perceptions of the corruption in local and central governments respectively. Answer categories to both questions were: "Not at 5 all", "Not many people", "Fairly common", and "Almost everyone is corrupt."
[ Figure 1 about Here] Figure 1a illustrates the weighted frequencies of respondents' answers to both questions.
Regarding local governments, 8.29% of the respondents answered "Not at all," 32.12% opted for "Not many people," 33.71% chose "Fairly common," and 3.93% of the respondents said "Almost everyone is corrupt." Meanwhile, 21.95% of the answers were DKs. Regarding the central government, 10.95% of the respondents answered "Not at all," 27.73% opted for "Not many people," 6.72% chose "Fairly common," and 0.30% of the respondents answered "Almost everyone is corrupt." 54.30% of the answers were DKs. It is clear that survey respondents, on average, perceived more corruption in local governments than in their central government. At the same time, many people did not have much information to provide meaningful evaluations of government corruption in China, i.e., around 22% chose DK regarding corruption in their local governments and even more respondents, around 54%, chose DK regarding corruption in the central government. To avoid possible and unpredictable biases in empirical analysis due to too many missing values, we focus on respondents' perceptions of corruption in local governments in the following analyses.
After asking about people's perceptions of corruption in China, interviewers also probed respondents for any personal experiences of corruption: "Have you or your families personally experienced any government corruption in recent years?" 20.05% of the respondents gave positive answers; 77.59% gave negative answers. This finding, combined with the information in As displayed in Figure 1b , among those without personal experience with corruption, 17.27% learned about corruption from other people; 2.77% learned from colleagues; 56.78% learned from the mass media (controlled by the regime); 1.03% learned from internal documents; and 26.36% did not provide meaningful answers. Given respondents' self-reported information, the mass media seem to be the most common source from which Chinese citizens learn about government corruption. Following this formal but indirect information channel, grapevine news is the second most commonly accessed information source, i.e., almost 20% of the respondents obtained some sort of information about official corruption from other people or their colleagues. 
Mass Media Exposure, Grapevine Rumors, and Political Attitudes
Mass media's effects on public opinion have been controversial among scholars, partially due to the difficulty in capturing its exact effect on opinion formation (Bartels, 1993) . For such a reason, early research of media impacts on people's political attitudes and behavior, especially people's voting behavior, concentrated primarily on the frequency of media exposure. This research found that mass media had "minimal effects" on people's political choices (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) .
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Later scholars pay more attention to the content and form of media coverage and find that media has strong but primarily malign effects on people's political attitudes. These scholars have even coined the term "videomalaise" for this argument (e.g., Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000) . Some scholars blame watching television for reduced civic engagement because of its displacement of other leisure activities and community involvement, as well as the "mean world" syndrome due to its emphasis on violence and crime (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; Putnam, 1995) . Others argue that politics is often presented negatively on television, given its excessive emphasis on the "poll-driven horse race" and "strategic game frames" (Hart, 1994; Jamieson, 1992; Schudson, 1995) . Moreover, market competition and the search for larger audiences and higher circulation figures have forced the media to dwell on dramatic news, "especially bad news about crime and conflict, death and disaster, political incompetence and corruption, sex and scandal" (Newton, 1999, p. 577) . While the mass media are assigned the critical role of government watchdog, they are at the same time blamed for undermining democratic politics because of prevalent negative reporting. Following this logic, it is expected that formal media coverage of corruption in democracies is more likely to exacerbate citizens' perceptions of corruption in their governments.
In contrast, the mass media in authoritarian and other illiberal regimes are always influenced to varying extents by their states so as to forge supportive sentiment. Such regimes not only use media to mobilize political support, but also to shape people's attitudes toward the government. This is even true for post-Mao China, where mass media are still heavily used for mobilization and propaganda (Shirk, 2011a) . It is undeniable that over the past several decades, the Chinese government has gradually liberalized its news media through commercialization and marketization. Consequently, the party mouthpieces of the earlier communist regime have been 8 partially transformed into profit-making ventures financed by sales of advertisements and private investments. Commercial liberalization has dramatically reduced government influence over the selection, framing, and wording of news stories (Esarey, 2005 (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011) .
However, it would be going too far to conclude that the authoritarian state has lost its control over the Chinese media, especially its news content. China's media have been characterized as boasting "commercialization without independence", enjoying "bird-caged press freedom", and resembling "watchdogs on the party leashes" (Chen & Chan, 1998; Zhao, 2000) . Major newspapers, radio and television stations are still subject to close supervision from the State Publication and Press Administration, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, and the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These institutions can influence the organization of the media industry, make personnel decisions, and most importantly issue directives for news content. Media practitioners are only free to report issues according to their own standards and decisions so long as they do not overstep certain boundaries set by the CCP. When an issue is seen as being core to social stability, economic growth, and the CCP's survival, the state usually will and is able to exert considerable control over the Chinese news media (Stockmann, 2011) . Thus, to most media scholars, commercialization has yet to change the nature of Chinese mass media (e.g., Hassid, 2008) .
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News coverage on official corruption is no doubt highly politically sensitive as such reports can embarrass government officials, arouse public resentment against the regime and lead to social unrest. Therefore, many investigative reports by journalists on official corruption in China may not appear in the media. contents, format, and even general tone of news reports were carefully synchronized by the Party (Gang & Bandurski, 2011) . And most importantly, the reporting of such issues has been primarily framed as the success of the government's anticorruption efforts. 5 Through such sophisticated media control, the CCP tries to make Chinese citizens believe in the government's sincere and serious efforts against corruption, and that uncovered official corruptions are isolated incidents rather than examples of a systematic and more prevalent problem (Zhao, 2000) . As such, media exposure in contemporary China, essentially different from that in democracies, may actually help the regime mobilize the society, shape a more positive public perception regarding the Chinese government's anti-corruption commitment and efforts, and even lower the perceived severity and breadth of official corruption.
Nevertheless, the CCP's tight media control is unable to completely block the free flow of information. When formal sources of information are controlled, people use alternative sources 10 to acquire pertinent information. Among them, grapevine news is of particular interest and significance. Grapevine news can be simply defined as unofficial information transmitted via a mouth-to-mouth mechanism, which "works through and is animated by story-telling, rumor and gossip" (Ball & Vincent, 1998, p. 379) . The impacts of grapevine news have been largely overlooked by political scientists, probably because most research on mass media and public opinion has focused on democratic societies with transparent governance and open information access. However, rumors are at their most rife "in the absence of other, more reliable sources of information. It is a way of filling in missing information or explaining the inexplicable" (Ball, 1987, p. 219) . Hence, grapevine news may naturally arise and affect people's cognition of politics and behavior more significantly in societies wherein information is less easily accessible, like mainland China.
An important characteristic of grapevine news is that it tends to exaggerate the reality of an issue, often presenting singular issues as more common problems. Therefore, rumors and gossip have an especially malignant effect, which could be highly seditious and fuel political insecurities. In fact, in many situations, grapevine rumors have been effectively used as "weapons of the weak" to criticize the authority offstage (Scott, 1985) . Governments in traditional societies, e.g., England in the late 1500s and early 1600s, with limited information circulation through officially sanctioned channels were also especially concerned about the detrimental impact of wild stories and groundless speculations (Fox, 1997) . Even in contemporary Argentina and Haiti, when the military junta in the 1970s and 1990s respectively cracked down on journalists and writers and stopped the free flow of information through the mass media, the public resorted to information transmitted by word of mouth. In these violent and dangerous situations, the throng of frequently repeated rumors could "calcify into accepted 11 representation of social reality and political life" (Perice, 1997, p. 1) .
Furthermore, grapevine news is especially powerful when disseminating information about certain significant topics, particularly negative news that formal authorities are disinclined to discuss in public. 6 To some degree, grapevine news is similar to tabloids news, which tends to cover sensational and negative stories. But unlike tabloid news, grapevine news cannot be effectively regulated and censored by government. The nature of grapevine news thus encourages political dissidents to sometimes intentionally forge negative news, distort facts, and spread rumors about the government to promote their goals. For instance, in 1989 during the Tian'anmen incident, Huang Jing, a then-PhD student at Harvard University, claimed that Li Peng, the then-Premier of China, was shot in the leg during an assassination attempt by his bodyguard and Deng Xiaoping had been sick. Several American TV programs immediately took the two stories for real and reported those stories as developments in the students' democratic movement. However, Huang later confessed under camera that he deliberately spread the rumor to force Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping to appear in public (Manheim, 1991, pp. 155-156) .
Finally, as Ball and Vincent argue, grapevine news in many cases has often been seen as reliable and trustworthy, thanks to its nature as "hot knowledge, based on affective responses or direct experiences" (1998, p. 389) , and usually thought to be personal and reliable. Therefore, when people learn about corruption from the grapevine, they may tend to believe in the seriousness of government corruption and hold a negative view of the situation.
Nevertheless, arguing that grapevine news tend to be perceived as reliable does not necessarily mean that grapevine news overrides official information once they interact.
Grapevine information is not always digested uncritically either. As some recent work recognizes, elite rhetoric transmitted through official channels and interpersonal conversations usually have 12 competing effects on public opinion formation (e.g., Druckman & Nelson, 2003 
Statistical Models and Results
To test the above hypotheses, we combine ABS I data with a compiled dataset on the number of local official corruption cases reported in newspapers from different provincial-level administrative units in 2002. 7 Media coverage of such corruption cases is collected from major local newspapers, including daily party newspapers, and some semi-commercialized, and commercialized newspapers. Affiliation with the CCP: According to Anderson and Tverdova (2003) , support of the regime attenuates the negative impact of corruption on government trust. We expect people affiliated with the ruling party to be government supporters, and more likely to perceive a lower level of corruption.
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Normative orientation toward collectivism: A lot of research has argued that social norms and culture can have certain impacts on popular perceptions of corruption (e.g., Bowser, 2001 ).
The hierarchically structured cultural tradition, as well as the emphasis on order and collective interest, has been blamed of driving the higher tolerance of corruption in East Asian societies (Lipset & Lenz, 2000) . If this is the case, it is possible that those who are normatively oriented toward collectivism are less likely to perceive corruption as a serious and prevalent problem in local governments. During the interview, respondents were asked if they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed, or strongly agreed with the following statements: 1) "Generally speaking, individual interest should be secondary to family interest;" 2) "For the sake of national interest, individual interest should be sacrificed;" and 3) "Sacrificing individual interest for collective interest is out of date now." 23 Respondents' averaged scores over these three questions are used to measure their collectivistic orientations.
Interpersonal trust: Perception of corruption is also influenced by one's general view of the 15 world and society. 24 Those who tend to trust others are more likely to trust government officials and perceive less corruption (Canache & Allison, 2005 in mainland China suggest that cognitive and information deficiencies, rather than political fear, are the key driving force for DKs in politically sensitive survey questions (e.g., Ren, 2009; Yan, 2008) . In other words, DK-givers differ significantly from those providing meaningful answers 16 in terms of cognitive sophistication and information access. Thus, it is critical to take these differences into consideration through appropriate statistical modeling when examining on how popular belief on government corruption is sustained in today's China. Empirically, this is a typical sample-selection issue. Following the seminal work of Heckman (1979) , we specifically model 1) why some respondents were more likely to refuse to provide their perceptions of corruption in local governments; and 2) controlling this self-selection in providing meaningful answers to our key question, simultaneously estimate the impacts of the aforementioned factors on popular perceptions of government corruption.
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Since both strategies can be methodologically justified, we decide to run both models and intentionally use the results from the two models, with different assumptions, theoretical considerations, and estimation approaches, to cross-validate the robustness of our findings. 28 If both models confirm or reject some hypotheses, our confidence on the validity of the findings would be significantly increased. However, if the results from the two models diverge, we should be very cautious making interpretations, given their sensitivity to model specifications. Table 1 presents the results of Probit and Heckman Selection models.
[ Table 1 about here]
In the subsequent analyses, we first examine the impacts of different information sources on popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local governments, i.e., the highlighted section in Table 1 . It is evident that despite their distinct nature, the two models provide similar results on the impacts of various information sources on popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local governments. Thus, our following inferences on the impacts of different information sources on popular perceptions of government corruption are robust to model specifications.
As expected, first-hand information based on personal experiences plays a significant role in 17 shaping Chinese citizens' perceptions of corruption -those who have personal experiences of government corruption are significantly more likely to hold negative views of corruption in local governments. But as our analyses reveal, second-hand information from different sources also has significant impacts on people's evaluations of government corruption.
First of all, similar to the situation in liberal democracies, the frequency of media exposure does not have a statistically significant influence over popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local governments. At the first glance, this finding seems to be a little surprising, as Figure 1b shows that more than 50% of the respondents claimed that they learned about government corruption primarily from the mass media. However, the finding should not be interpreted as media coverage does not play a role in shaping people's perceptions of corruption in contemporary China. As revealed by both models, the number of corruption cases that covered in major local newspapers does significantly reduce people's perceptions of corruption in their respective local governments. As the news coverage of corruption predominately frames the issue as 1) authorities have both the necessary determination and capability to eliminate corruption and 2) uncovered corruption cases are merely isolated incidents rather than examples of a systematic phenomenon, people may be led to believe that corruption is not prevalent in Chinese local governments, and that the singular cases that have been covered by the media actually demonstrate the intention and efficacy of their government in rooting out all corruption.
Secondly, our analyses confirm that access to grapevine news makes people perceive a higher level of corruption in local governments. The vivid, though sometimes unfounded, content of grapevine news seems to be capable of effectively winning over some people's minds and exacerbating their perceptions of government corruption. Hence, H1 and H2 are both confirmed by our empirical evidence.
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Thirdly, it is critical to remind our readers that, given the existence of interaction items, the aforementioned regression coefficients of media exposure frequency, as well as access to grapevine news, can ONLY be interpreted as their respective impacts on popular perceptions of corruption in local governments when there is NO formal coverage of corruption cases in the local newspapers. 29 As shown in Table 1 , the two interaction terms are statistically significant in both Probit and Heckman Selection models. Such findings tell us that the formal coverage of corruption not only directly shapes public corruption perceptions, but also significantly moderates how media exposure frequency and access to grapevine news influence this critical public opinion.
To facilitate our readers' understanding of the interaction terms, we have run simulations on the marginal effects (based on the Heckman Selection estimates), i.e., impacts on the log-ratio of the probability of holding a positive view on corruption in Chinese local governments, of media exposure frequency and access to grapevine news respectively, as the number of reported corruption cases increases from 0 to 12 (the respective minimum and maximum value in our data). The marginal effects, as well as their correspondingly 95% confidence intervals, are illustrated in Figure 2 .
[ Figure 2 about here]
The statistically significant and positive interaction between media exposure frequency and the number of media reported corruption cases seems to suggest that the more corruption cases are covered in newspapers, the less powerful the effect of media exposure frequency in soliciting a favorable view of the corruption in Chinese local governments. 30 Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2a , when the number of reported corruption cases grows from its minimum to the maximum, the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient of media exposure frequency always 19 cover zero: the marginal impact is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In other words, despite the statistical significance of this interaction effect, substantively it is negligible or marginal at best.
In contrast, the interaction between access to grapevine news and the number of media reported corruption cases is negative and statistically significant. Given the positive and significant coefficient of access to grapevine news per se, this significant interaction suggests that when the formal information channel is completely blocked and people are only left with grapevine to form their perceptions of corruption in local governments, they can be easily lead away by the wild and negative speculations transmitted through grapevine news. However, when such corruption cases are covered in a carefully crafted and controlled way in newspapers, e.g., the situation in mainland China, pertinent information from officially sanctioned channels can contain and even suppress wild speculations, clear ambiguities, and even reorient people's attention toward how the Chinese government has been fighting and deterring corruption. This then dramatically weakens the negative impact of grapevine news on popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local governments. As shown in Figure 2b , when there is no officially reported corruption case in the media, the lower boundary of the 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of accessing grapevine news is above zero: it is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. When the number of reported corruption cases gradually increases up to the maximum value, the lower boundary of its confidence interval extends below zero; meanwhile, its upper boundary still hovers above zero. In other words, when there is some formal coverage of corruption cases in local newspapers, the substantive impact of accessing grapevine news is weakened, a decrease that rendered the coefficient no longer statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level. Thus, the diluting effect of formal coverage of corruption cases on grapevine news 20 is also confirmed to some extent by the empirical data.
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Most other variables performed as expected in both models. Rural residents on average are less critical and perceive a lower level of corruption in local governments than urban residents.
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Those who evaluate their current economic situation in a more positive way perceive less corruption in local governments. People who feel their incomes are unfair given their capability are also understandably more critical and perceive significantly more corruption. Besides, as found in existing research, people's normative and psychological features also play roles in their perceptions of government corruption. Chinese citizens who are more inclined to trust other people or normatively oriented toward collectivism are significantly less likely to perceive serious corruption in their local governments.
Conclusion and Suggestion
In this paper, we systematically examined factors that could contribute to the formation of people's perceptions of corruption in the local governments of a non-democratic society with considerable media control. Similar to their counterparts in some Latin American and Eastern
European societies, the majority of Chinese citizens have few personal experiences of government corruption. They learn about corruption mainly from the mass media and information related by others, or the so-called "grapevine rumors."
To test the effects of information from different channels on public perceptions of governmental corruption, we combined ABS I survey data from mainland China with a dataset on local media coverage of government corruption cases. Using different modeling strategies, we consistently found that similar to the situation in democratic societies, the frequency of media exposure had a negligible effect on respondents' perceptions of government corruption regardless of how much pertinent information was reported in the mass media. But more importantly, our 21 analyses show that the carefully and tightly controlled media's coverage of corruption cases in China can actually significantly decrease people's perceptions of corruption in local governments.
This is compatible with most recent scholarship on media effects in authoritarian China (e.g., Shirk, 2011a; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011) . Basically, although Chinese mass media has been commercially liberalized over the past several decades, the CCP's propaganda departments are still capable of setting the agenda for and framing the news coverage of issues they believe to have important socio-political implications. More specifically, to a large extent, the party-state can still effectively shape people's perceptions of government corruption through their propaganda and mobilization through the controlled mass media.
However, the seemingly airtight media control still leaves room for information from unofficial sources to affect public perceptions of corruption. Our findings suggest that grapevine news, including rumors and gossip, is particularly influential at delivering information about certain significant topics that the Chinese government has strong incentive to hide from the public, such as official corruption. The speculative nature of grapevine rumors usually has a negative impact on people's attitudes on issues like government corruption. When there is little information revealed in the mass media on government corruption, ceteris paribus, Chinese citizens with access to grapevine news, on average, perceive more serious problems of corruption in local governments than those who do not have such access.
But this does not mean the party-controlled mass media is completely powerless against grapevine rumors. Our analyses showed that media coverage on corruption actually diluted or even "defeated" the detrimental effects of grapevine rumors. This finding reveals a mechanism through which authoritarian regimes can subtly influence public opinion through skillful media control. In authoritarian societies, even if the government can keep people completely in the dark, And this facilitates authoritarian regimes' defense against possible pressure for democratic transition.
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Different from contemporary research on media effects in authoritarian societies, our research moves beyond the conventional focus on whether controlled mass media in these societies can directly lead to public opinions that favor their governments (e.g., Kern & Hainmueller, 2009; Parta, 2007) . Incorporating the information from informal sources, e.g., grapevine news, that conventional pertinent research inclines to ignore, our work sheds light on, at least a small but critical part of the more nuanced and indirect mechanisms through which media control may work in authoritarian societies and favor the rule of authoritarian regimes.
Thus, we strongly encourage future research to focus more on possible indirect effects of media control in authoritarian societies.
Last but not least, we do recognize the limits of our data and findings in this paper. Promotion Advertisement" run in Times Square, it is reasonable to infer that the CCP might have significantly increased its efforts in improving its image among both domestic and international audiences through media campaigns. Moreover, as experienced China scholar Susan Shirk observes, "In addition to outright censorship, the Chinese government has learned to shape news content by using increasingly sophisticated press management methods" (Shirk, 2011b, p. 238) .
Therefore, we believe the CCP government might have been even more cautious and possibly more sophisticated in manipulating its domestic media for political purposes, like shaping popular perceptions of government corruption. However, whether this is the case or not in today's China can only be answered with future systematic empirical work. 5 Framing has been generally described as the essence of public opinion formation. Many scholars have shown that political elites and mass media can influence public opinion by picking alternative definitions or emphasizing only a subset of potentially relevant considerations. By these means, they may change the content of individuals' beliefs, affect the importance individuals attach to particular beliefs, or cause individuals to only focus on the considerations favorable to politicians and overlook other considerations when constructing their opinions. See (Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Nelson & Oxley, 1999) 
